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OPINION* 
________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 David Morgan, proceeding as a qui tam relator, appeals the District Court’s 
dismissal of his claims under the False Claims Act1 and corresponding state laws.  The 
District Court dismissed the claims, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction since they were based on publicly disclosed allegations 
whose “original source” was not Morgan.  We will affirm.2 
 Morgan was not the “original source” of his allegations that various 
pharmaceutical industry defendants profited from artificially inflated Average Wholesale 
Prices (AWPs) for brand-name drugs, as he had no “direct and independent knowledge of 
the information on which the allegations are based.”3  In fact, Morgan was further 
removed from the alleged unlawful conduct than the relator in United States ex rel. 
Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P.,4 who was the vice president of a purported co-
conspirator. 
 Morgan was never employed by any of the entities that allegedly profited from the 
conspiracy.  Morgan is a pharmacist who says he discovered the widespread price 
inflation of brand-name drugs “[t]hrough his diligence,” which amounted to an eyeball 
comparison of two publicly available price listings.  After noticing the pricing 
discrepancy, Morgan says he became aware, while conducting an audit, of 
communications between wholesaler First Databank, Inc., and price listing publisher 
                                              
1 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. 
2 We have jurisdiction to consider Morgan’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
3 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2006) (amended 2010, without retroactive effect); see 31 
U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (divesting federal courts of jurisdiction over FCA claims based 
on publicly disclosed allegations “unless . . . the person bringing the action is an original 
source of the information”). 
4 769 F.3d 837, 842 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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AmerisourceBergen Corp., which indicated that First Databank knew of the price 
differential.  As the District Court correctly pointed out, Morgan’s Third Amended 
Complaint “does not demonstrate that Morgan had any direct knowledge of any alleged 
wrongdoing” as to the myriad other defendants. 
 We held in Schumann that “knowledge of a scheme is not direct when it is gained 
by reviewing files.”5  Yet that was the full extent of Morgan’s “diligence.”  Moreover, 
Morgan’s knowledge of the pharmaceutical industry does not make him an original 
source.6  Albeit informed by his years of experience, Morgan’s assessment of publicly 
available information and allegedly conspiratorial communications to which Morgan was 
not a party is not sufficient to demonstrate the “direct and independent knowledge” 
required under the FCA’s original source exception.7 
 The District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Morgan’s allegations 
were “based upon the public disclosure of allegations” in the news media, other civil 
proceedings, and a Congressional report.8  Applying our “twofold analysis,” we first note 
that the allegations that pharmacy benefit managers, including Express Scripts, Inc., and 
MedCo Health Solutions, Inc., profited from inflated AWPs and secret spread pricing 
                                              
5 Id. at 847. 
6 See id. (quoting United States ex rel. Zizic v. Q2Administrators, LLC, 728 F.3d 228, 240 
(3d Cir. 2013)). 
7 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). 
8 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). 
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“was disclosed via [multiple] sources listed in § 3730(e)(4)(A).” 9  Second, we may 
deduce that Morgan’s allegations are “based on” the public disclosures predating his 
complaint even without resort to algebraic representation,10 because Morgan forwarded 
one such news article to a colleague with the caption, “Gotta love this!!”  While public 
disclosures “need only be ‘supported by’ or ‘substantially similar to’ the disclosed 
allegations” to bar suit under the FCA,11 here Morgan demonstrated actual familiarity 
with disclosures that describe substantially the same price-related misconduct identified 
in the complaint. 
 Morgan’s central allegation—that the pharmacy benefit manager defendants knew 
First Databank fraudulently inflated their profits but nonetheless chose First Databank as 
their exclusive pricing source—also echoes allegations from previously filed lawsuits, 
                                              
9 See United States ex rel. Atkinson v. PA. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 519 (3d Cir. 
2007).  News media disclosures included a March 31, 2003, Wall Street Journal article 
entitled “Pharmacy-Benefit Firms Profit on Generic Drugs,” that paraphrased a 
pharmaceutical benefit manager pricing expert’s observation, “it’s an open secret in the 
industry that AWPs often are severely inflated” and that “industry veterans joke that 
AWP ought to stand for ‘Ain’t What’s Paid.’”  J.A. at 568-72.  The Journal article also 
noted that pharmacy benefit firms were “trying to take advantage of the ‘spread’ between 
pharmacy prices and what corporate and government clients pay.  Express Scripts says 
most of its contracts now include spread pricing.”  J.A. at 570.  See also, e.g., William 
Sherman, Rx Ripoffs Hard to Swallow:  State Probing Drug Pricing and Sales Tactics, 
N.Y. Daily News (July 27, 2003), J.A. at 1030-34; Pharmacy Benefit Managers Charged 
with Inflating, PR Newswire (Mar. 18, 2003), J.A. at 1036-40. 
10 See United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. Cnty. of Del., 123 F.3d 734, 741 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(quoting United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 654 
(D.C. Cir. 1994)). 
11 Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 519. 
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including one where Morgan served as a paid expert.12  The mere fact that Morgan 
quantified the AWP differential does not remove his allegations from the public 
disclosure realm.  Morgan’s 4.16% differential simply indicates an AWP based on a 25% 
markup over wholesale acquisition cost, a markup disclosed in a Congressional report 
predating Morgan’s complaint.13  The report’s disclosure of a specific, industry-wide 
markup shift provided Morgan with all the “essential elements” needed to arrive at a 
4.16% price differential.14  Since Morgan was not the original source of the allegations 
contained in his complaint, the public disclosure bar precludes his FCA claims. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss Morgan’s FCA and corresponding state law claims.15 
                                              
12 See, e.g., Compl., Brown v. Express Scripts, Inc., No. 3:04-cv-01822-AWT (D. Conn. 
filed Oct. 28, 2004) (alleging Express Scripts “pockets the difference between the actual 
cost of the prescription paid to the pharmacy and the higher (inflated) price charged to the 
Fund,” thereby benefiting from a “secret differential or ‘spread’”); Second Am. Compl., 
Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Express Scripts, Inc., No. 4:03-CV-1521-SNL (E.D. Mo. filed Aug. 
16, 2004). 
13 See Medicaid Prescription Drug Reimbursement:  Why the Government Pays Too 
Much, Hearings before Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, H.R. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 12, 13-71 (2004). 
14 See Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 741.  As the District Court noted, “the percentage difference 
between an AWP based on a 20% markup,” the previous industry norm, “and one based 
on a 25% markup will always be 4.16%.” 
15 We will also affirm the District Court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss Morgan’s allegations of “other pricing schemes,” including “duplicate billing,” 
“refilling violations,” and “overbilling for professional fees,” since Morgan fails to state 
those claims “with particularity,” as required under Rule 9(b). 
